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Abstract
New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia
- price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs
(Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These
alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to
a first order of approximation they imply an isomorhpic Phillips curve and, if the
steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in
an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions.
In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-
mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global
solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts
is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the for-
mer typically exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation
observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfort-
ably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in
the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation
emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider
the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be
significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not
innocuous.
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1 Introduction
Mainstream macroeconomic analysis of both monetary and fiscal policy relies heavily on
the New Keynesian model. The distinguishing feature of this model, relative to a more
classical approach, is that it contains some form of nominal inertia. This allows monetary
policy to have real effects, and widens the degree of interaction between monetary and
fiscal policies, since monetary policy affects both the size of the tax base and real debt
service costs in such models. Typically, one of two workhorse forms of nominal inertia
are adopted in the literature - Calvo (1983) price contracts, and Rotemberg (1982) price
adjustment costs. In the former, firms are only able to adjust their prices after random
intervals of time, such that, outside of a zero inflation steady-state there will be a costly
dispersion of prices across firms. While the latter implies that all firms behave symmet-
rically in setting the same price, but that they face quadratic adjustment costs in doing
so. Despite this fundamental difference, researchers have typically treated the two ap-
proaches as being equivalent since the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) they imply
are, to a first order of approximation, isomorphic when linearized around a zero inflation
steady state. Moreover, when that zero inflation steady-state is also efficient (that is, it
matches the output level that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner) it can be
shown that the second order approximation to welfare rewritten in terms of inflation and
the output gap is also the same across the two approaches (see Nistico, 2007). Under
these conditions, to a first order of approximation, the two approaches would yield the
same policy implications. For these reasons the two approaches have largely been treated
as synonymous within the New Keynesian literature.
However, despite this broad consensus, there are examples within the literature where
the two approaches do differ. The first is where the steady-state around which we ap-
proximate the New Keynesian economy is not efficient. For example, Lombardo and
Vestin (2008) relax the assumption of Nistico (2007) and consider the second order ap-
proximation to welfare when the steady state is not efficient. They find that the costs of
such inefficiencies are typically larger in the Calvo economy. This mirrors the results in
Damjanovic and Nolan (2011).
The second assumption underpinning the equivalence result, is that the economy is
approximated around a zero inflation steady state (or that any steady-state inflation is
perfectly indexed and therefore costless, see Yun (1996)). A literature considering the
importance of trend inflation argues that this is not the case, and that the implications of
failing to account for trend inflation can be dramatic, see Ascari and Sbordone (2013) for
a survey. The presence of even a modest degree of (unindexed) steady-state inflation can
radically overturn determinacy results, undermine the learnability of rational expectations
equilibria, affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism and change the nature
of optimal policy. Moreover, these effects can differ across the two forms of nominal
inertia (Ascari and Rossi, 2012) with the larger impact of trend inflation being felt under
Calvo. The large costs of trend inflation under Calvo is also reflected in the analysis of
Damjanovic and Nolan (2010b) where the seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation is at
double digit levels under Rotemberg pricing, but only single digits under Calvo. In short
there appears to be significant non-linearities in the New Keynesian model which are
affected by the size of the steady-state distortion, the degree of unindexed inflation and
the type of nominal inertia adopted. However, this evidence largely comes from studies
which linearize such economies, either to a first or second order approximation, after
allowing for such factors.
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In this paper we solve the benchmark New Keynesian model non-linearly using the two
standard approaches to modelling price stickiness. Since we are not imposing any kind
of approximation around a steady-state we can see clearly the extent to which the two
approaches differ. Moreover, rather than consider the Ramsey problem or commitment
to a simple monetary rule, we shall consider time-consistent optimal policy (commonly
known as discretion). This in turn, given that we are not using any artificial devices to
ensure the model’s steady-state is efficient, implies that we can measure the extent of
the inflationary bias problem under the two forms of nominal inertia. This identifies the
extent to which a policy maker who is constrained to be time-consistent would be unable
to prevent a costly rise in steady-state or trend inflation. This is an important measure
of the non-linearities across the two descriptions of pricing behavior, but also serves as
a plausibility check on the relevance of the effects highlighted in the literature on trend
inflation. The inflation bias thus measures the maximum level of unindexed inflation that
a policy maker would be forced to tolerate - the policy maker which allowed inflation to
rise above this level is behaving sub-optimally even given the constraint that they cannot
commit. Therefore if the level of inflation bias is significantly below that required to
generate the perverse results found in the trend-inflation literature then we would need
to find a reason why policy makers are not only failing to commit, but are generating
inflation levels well beyond the maximum inflation bias before we need worry about these
properties of the New Keynesian model. While if the model implies a sizeable inflation
bias then the issues raised by the trend inflation literature and, more generally, the non-
linearities inherent in the New Keynesian model need to be taken more seriously.
There is also an empirical literature which focusses on these two distortions in helping
to explain inflation dynamics. Ireland (2007) allows for time variation in the Fed’s infla-
tion target to explain the evolution of US inflation. Cogley and Sargent (2002) argue that
much of the movement in US inflation reflects movements in an underlying trend, rather
than in fluctuations relative to that trend. While several authors have sought to identify
the level of trend inflation using generalizations of the new Keynesian Phillips curve which
allow for time varying (unindexed) trend inflation. As an example of the findings of this
literature, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) argue that trend inflation rather than any kind
of backward-looking indexation behavior is a major component of observed movements
in inflation. Again we can ask - can the benchmark model, using either Rotemberg or
Calvo pricing plausibly deliver the size of unindexed steady state or trend inflation these
papers infer to explain the data?
Moving away from the Ramsey description of policy is important as such a policy
implies that the optimal rate of inflation the policy maker would commit to would be
zero in the benchmark model employing either Calvo or Rotemberg pricing (Woodford,
2003) and in the case of Calvo contracts very close to zero in models with other distortions
due to, for example, fiscal policy (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004) or a desire to generate
seigniorage revenues (Damjanovic and Nolan, 2011). Under Rotemberg, the example of
Damjanovic and Nolan suggests that since the welfare costs of nominal inertia do not rise
as sharply as the rate of inflation rises under Rotemberg, that this may not be a general
result across the two descriptions of nominal inertia. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
Ramsey policy would typically imply that inflation was far lower and stable than appears
to be found in the data.1
1Chen et al. (2014) assess the relative empirical performance of a New Keynesian model with habits
and inflation inertia with policy described by not only by simple rules, but also optimal policy under
discretion, commitment and quasi-commitment. They find that discretion fits the data far better than
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There are some recent papers using global solution techniques which also consider opti-
mal discretionary policy in the benchmark model under Calvo contracts - see Van Zandweghe
and Wolman (2011) and Anderson et al. (2010), which is then extended in Ngo (2014) to
allow for discount factor shocks which imply that policy must account for the zero lower
bound (ZLB).2 Other authors also consider issues relating to the ZLB in models which
use Rotemberg pricing, but also introduce extensions such as capital (see Gavin et al.
(2013), Braun and Korber (2011), Johannsen (2014)), consumption habits (Gust et al.
(2012) and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013)), labor market frictions (Roulleau-Pasdeloup
(2013)) or fiscal policy (Nakata (2013), Niemann et al. (2013) and Johannsen (2014)).3
Solving non-linear representations of an enriched New Keynesian model is typically far
more computationally intensive than conventional perturbation methods, and these lat-
ter authors have all adopted the Rotemberg description of price stickiness since this
reduces the number of state variables one must consider. Furthermore, in calibrating the
Rotemberg price adjustment cost parameter almost all these authors use a conventional
parameterization which matches the slope of the linearized NKPC across the Rotemberg
and Calvo variants of the New Keynesian model after assuming a zero inflation steady-
state. In other words the literature is typically implicitly assuming that the equivalence of
the two forms of nominal inertia is retained in non-linear solutions of the New Keynesian
model where the steady-state is distorted and the rate of inflation will typically not be
zero. To our knowledge, the current paper is the first to formally compare and contrast
time-consistent optimal policy under the two forms of price-setting using global solution
algorithms and therefore to assess how innocuous the choice of one form of price-setting
over the other actually is.
We find that the inflationary bias problem is non-trivial under both descriptions of
nominal inertia, but is much greater under Calvo. This is despite earlier results implying
that the costs of inflation are much higher under Calvo than Rotemberg. This essentially
arises because of the different average mark-up behavior under the two models. Under
Calvo higher inflation causes those firms who are able to adjust prices in a particular
period to raise that price in anticipation of not being able to readjust that price for a
prolonged period despite the general rise in the price level. This leads to an increase in
the average mark-up as inflation rises. In contrast, under Rotemberg all firms set the
same price, period by period, but face adjustment costs in doing so. In discounting future
profits they also discount future price adjustment costs. As a result in the face of higher
inflation the firms postpone some of the required price adjustment due to this discounting
effect, which serves to reduce the average markup. Accordingly, for a given degree of
monopolistic competition which induces an inflation bias, this further raises (lowers)
the markup under Calvo (Rotemberg) and thereby worsens (improves) the inflationary
bias problem. This effect also tends to imply that the inflationary impact of a given
cost-push shock is greater under Calvo pricing, ceteris paribus. While the presence of
an additional state variable under Calvo price-setting, namely price dispersion, can also
result in a hump-shaped response in output to cost-push shocks which would not be the
any other description of policy, especially commitment which is simply too effective in stabilising the
economy to be consistent with the data.
2Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2012), Wieland (2013) and Richter et al. (2013) also explore equilibrium
dynamics around the ZLB in variants of the New Keynesian model which adopt Calvo price contracts,
but which adopt a rule-based description of policy.
3Within this group, Shibayama and Sunakawa (2012), Nakata (2013), and Niemann et al. (2013)
explore optimal policy in various New Keynesian models using Rotemberg pricing. The others utilise a
rule-based description of policy.
4
case under either Rotemberg pricing or the benchmark linearized model. The fact that
steady-state inflation would ceteris paribus, and using standard calibration approaches,
be significantly higher under Calvo also has implications for the probability of hitting
the ZLB such that studies adopting Rotemberg pricing are more likely to experience such
episodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic
model under both Calvo and Rotemberg pricing. In section 3, we formulate the optimal
discretionary policy problem with Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. In section
4, we present numerical results. In section 5, we extend the analysis to allow for a
tax-driven cost-push shock to assess policy trade-offs. We conclude in section 6.
2 The Model
This section describes the basic economic structure in our model.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one. We shall assume full asset markets, such
that, through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint and make the same
consumption plans. As a result, at period 0 the typical household will seek to maximize
the following objective function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (1)
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount factor, Ct and Nt are a consumption aggregate,
and labour supply at period t, respectively.
The household purchases differentiated goods in a retail market and combines them
into composite goods using a CES aggregator:
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
,  > 1 (2)
where Ct(j) is the demand for differentiated goods of type j. The elasticity of substitution
between varieties t can be assumed to be time varying if we wish to allow for cost-push
or mark-up shocks, but here we hold it fixed.
The budget constraint at time t is given by∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt (3)
where Pt(j) is the nominal price of type j goods, Dt+1 is the nominal payoff of the nominal
bonds portfolio held at the end of period t, Ξ is the representative household’s share of
profits in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, and T are lump-sum taxes.
Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoffs. The labor market is
perfectly competitive and wages are fully flexible.
Households must first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across the
various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share of a particular good
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in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price differences—this minimizes the
costs of consumption. The demand curve for each good j is,
Ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct (4)
where the aggregate price level Pt is defined to be
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
. (5)
The dynamic budget constraint at period t can therefore be rewritten as
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt. (6)
2.1.1 Households’ problem
The household’s decision problem can be dealt with in two stages. First, regardless of the
level of Ct the household purchases the combination of individual goods that minimizes
the cost of achieving this level of the composite good. Second, given the cost of achieving
any given level of Ct, the household chooses Ct, Dt+1 and Nt optimally. We have solved
the first stage problem above. For tractability, we assume that (1) takes the specific form
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
. (7)
where σ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply.
We can then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (6) to obtain the
optimal allocation of consumption across time,
β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)
= Qt,t+1.
Taking conditional expectations on both sides and rearranging gives
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1, (8)
where Rt ≡ 1Et(Qt,t+1) is the gross nominal return on a riskless one period bond paying
off a unit of currency in t + 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation which
implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time such that the
marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after allowing for tilting due to
interest rates differing from the households’ rate of time preference).
The second first order condition concerning labour supply decision is given by(
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t . (9)
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2.2 Firms
Each firm produces a differentiated good j using a constant returns to scale production
function:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (10)
where Yt(j) is the output of firm j, and Nt(j) denotes the hours hired by the firm, At is
an exogenous aggregate productivity shock at period t, and at = log(At) is time varying
and stochastic4.
Similar to the household’s problem, we first consider the cost minimization problem
of firm j,
min
{Nt(j)}
(
Wt
Pt
)
Nt(j) s.t. Yt(j) ≤ AtNt(j).
which implies
mct =
Wt
PtAt
, (11)
where mct is the Lagrange multiplier and also the real marginal cost of production. Note
that the real marginal cost described in (11) does not depend on the output level of an
individual firm, so long as its production function exhibits constant returns to scale and
prices of inputs (here labor) are fully flexible.
The demand curve the firm j faces is given by
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt,
where Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
.
The intermediate-good sector is monopolistically competitive and the intermediate
good producer therefore has market power. In the following, we consider two alternative
forms of price stickiness - firstly that due to Rotemberg (1982) and then that of Calvo
(1983).
2.2.1 Rotemberg Pricing
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting
nominal prices, which can be measured in terms of the final good and given by
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt (12)
where φ ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The adjustment cost, which
accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer–firm relationship, in-
creases in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall scale of
economic activity Yt.
The problem for firm j is then to maximize the discounted value of nominal profits,
max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+sΞt+s
4Typically, the logarithm of At is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: at = ρaat−1 + eat, 0 ≤ ρa < 1
where technology shock eat is an i.i.d. random variable, which has a zero mean and a finite standard
deviation σa.
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where nominal profits are defined as
Ξt = Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt (13)
= Pt(j)
1−P t Yt −mctPt(j)−P 1+t Yt −
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt.
Firms can change their price in each period, subject to the payment of the adjustment
cost. Hence, all the firms face the same problem, and thus will choose the same price,
and produce the same quantity. In other words, Pt(j) = Pt and Yt(j) = Yt for any j.
Hence, the first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium is
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (14)
This is the Rotemberg version of the non-linear Phillips curve that relates current inflation
to future expected inflation and to the level of output.
2.2.2 Calvo Pricing
Each period, the firms that adjust their price are randomly selected, and a fraction 1− θ
of all firms adjust while the remaining θ fraction do not adjust. Those firms that do
adjust their price at time t do so to maximize the expected discounted value of current
and future profits. Profits at some future date t + s are affected by the choice of price
at time t only if the firm has not received another opportunity to adjust between t and
t+ s. The probability of this is θs.
The firm’s pricing decision problem then involves picking Pt(j) to maximize discounted
nominal profits Using the demand curve for the firm’s product, this objective function
can be written as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
Pt(j)
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+s −mct+s
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+sPt+s
]
.
where the discount factor Qt,t+s is given by β
s
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
, and mct+s is the marginal
cost of production.
Let P ∗t be the optimal price chosen by all firms able to reset their price at time t. The
first order condition for the optimal choice of P ∗t is,
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
(15)
where
Kpt = C
−σ
t mctYt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)
Kpt+1
]
F pt = C
−σ
t Yt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)−1
F pt+1
]
.
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The price index evolves according to
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1 with Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1
. (16)
and price dispersion is described by
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1. (17)
2.3 Aggregate Conditions
Under Rotemberg pricing, as all the firms will employ the same amount of labour, the
aggregate production function is simply given by
Yt = AtNt.
and the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct +
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt.
Note that the Rotemberg adjustment cost creates an inefficiency wedge ψRt between out-
put and consumption
Ct =
(
1− ψRt
)
Yt =
(
1− ψRt
)
AtNt (18)
where ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2.
In the case of Calvo pricing, firms changing prices in different periods will generally
have different prices. Thus, the model features price dispersion. When firms have different
relative prices, there are distortions that create a wedge between the aggregate output
measured in terms of production factor inputs and aggregate demand measured in terms
of the composite goods. Specifically,
Nt(j) =
Yt(j)
At
=
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt
At
which yields,
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj =
Yt∆t
At
after integrating across firms. ∆t ≥ 1 implies that price dispersion is always costly in
terms of aggregate output: the higher ∆t, the more labour is needed to produce a given
level of output. Moreover, under Calvo different firms with different prices will employ
different amounts of labor. This explains why higher price dispersion acts as a negative
productivity shift in the aggregate production function: Yt = (At/∆t)Nt. In addition,
price dispersion is a backward-looking variable, and introduces an inertial component
into the model.
Under Calvo, the aggregate resource constraint is simply given by
Yt = Ct.
Hence, define ψct = ∆t − 1 as an inefficiency wedge under Calvo, then
Ct = Yt =
AtNt
(1 + ψct )
(19)
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Comparing (18) and (19), it is illuminating to note that the Rotemberg adjustment
cost creates a wedge ψRt between aggregate consumption and aggregate output, while the
Calvo price dispersion creates a wedge ψct between aggregate hours and aggregate output.
In addition, both wedges are non-linear functions of inflation, and they are minimized at
one when steady-state inflation equals zero (Π = 1), and both wedges increase as trend
inflation moves away from zero. See Ascari and Rossi (2012) for a discussion.
Appendix C.1 summarizes the models under Rotemberg and Calvo pricing.
3 Optimal Policy Problem Under Discretion
Under discretion, the monetary authority solves a sequential or period-by-period opti-
mization problem, which maximizes the representative household’s expected discounted
utility subject to the optimality conditions from market participants, the aggregate condi-
tions, and the law of motion for the state variables. Therefore, under optimal discretion,
the policymaker cannot commit to a plan in the hope of influencing economic agents’
expectations.
3.1 Rotemberg Pricing
Let V (At) represents the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the optimal
policy problem. The optimal monetary policy then solves the following optimization
problem:
V (At) = max{Ct,Yt,Πt}
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)]
}
(20)
subject to,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt (21)
and,
(1− )+ YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1−φΠt (Πt − 1)+φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0 (22)
Defining an auxilliary function,
M(At+1) ≡ C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
we can rewrite the Phillips curve (22) as,
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)] = 0
which captures the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any change in the state
variable will affect expectations, but cannot promise to behave in a particular way to-
morrow in order to influence expectations today. The optimal policy problem can then
be formulated as the following Lagrangian,
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)]
}
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where λ1t and λ2t are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions and comple-
mentary slackness conditions are given as follows,
C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σYt
ϕCσ−1t At
−ϕ−1 + σφβCσ−1t Y
−1
t Et [M(At+1)]
}
,
Yt
ϕAt
−1−ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕYt
ϕ−1Cσt At
−ϕ−1 − φβCσt Y −2t Et [M(At+1)]
}
,
λ1tφ (1− Πt)Yt = λ2tφ (2Πt − 1) ,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt,
0 = (1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)] .
Note that consumption Euler equation is non-binding from the point of view of maximiz-
ing utility, because Rt (a variable of no direct interest in utility) can effectively be chosen
to achieve the desired level of consumption.
The fully nonlinear problem is then to find five policy functions which relate the three
choice variables {Yt, Ct, Πt} and two Lagrange multipliers {λ1t, λ2t} to the state variable
At, that is, Yt = Y (At), Ct = C(At), Πt = Π(At), λ1t = λ1(At), and λ2t = λ2(At). We
will use the Chebyshev collocation method to approximate these five time invariant rules.
3.2 Calvo Pricing
Let V (∆t−1, At) denote the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the
optimal policy problem. The optimal monetary policy under discretion then can be
described as a set of decision rules for {Ct, Yt,Πt, P
∗
t
Pt
, Kpt , F
p
t ,∆t} which maximize,
V (∆t−1, At) = max
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)]
}
subject to the following constraints,
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
with
Kpt = (∆tYt)
ϕAt
−ϕ−1Yt + θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)]
F pt = YtC
−σ
t + θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)] ,
where we have utilized two auxilliary functions,
M(∆t, At+1) = (Πt+1)
Kpt+1
and
L(∆t, At+1) = (Πt+1)
−1 F pt+1,
which highlights the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any change in the state
variable will affect expections, but cannot promise to behave in a particular way tomorrow
in order to influence expectations today. Inflation:
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1
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Price dispersion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1.
As before, the policy problem can be written in Lagrangian form as follows:
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)]
+ λ1t[Yt − Ct]
+ λ2t
[
P ∗t
Pt
−
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
]
+ λ3t
{
Kpt − (∆tYt)ϕAt−ϕ−1Yt − θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)]
}
+ λ4t
{
F pt − YtC−σt − θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)]
}
+ λ5t
[
1− (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
− θ(Πt)−1
]
+ λ6t
[
∆t − (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
− θ (Πt) ∆t−1
]
where λjt (j = 1, .., 6) are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions are given
as follows: for consumption,
C−σt − λ1t + σYtC−σ−1t λ4t = 0
output,
−(∆t/At)1+ϕY ϕt + λ1t − (1 + ϕ)(∆tYt)ϕAt−ϕ−1λ3t − C−σt λ4t = 0
optimal price,
λ2t + (1− θ)(− 1)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
λ5t + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−−1
λ6t = 0
inflation,
−(− 1)θλ5t − θ∆t−1Πtλ6t = 0
numerator of optimal price Kpt ,
−
(

− 1
)
1
F pt
λ2t + λ3t = 0
denominator of optimal price F pt ,(

− 1
)
Kpt
(F pt )
2
λ2t + λ4t = 0
and price dispersion,
0 = −(Yt/At)1+ϕ∆ϕt + β
∂Et [V (∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
− ϕ(∆t)ϕ−1At−ϕ−1Y ϕ+1t λ3t
− θβ ∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ3t − θβ ∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ4t + λ6t
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Note that the envelope theorem yields
∂V (∆t−1, At)
∂∆t−1
= −θ (Πt) λ6t
which allows us to rewrite the first order condition for price dispersion as,
0 = −(Yt/At)1+ϕ(∆t)ϕ − θβEt [(Πt+1) λ6t+1]− ϕ(∆t)ϕ−1At−ϕ−1Y ϕ+1t λ3t
− θβ ∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ3t − θβ ∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ4t + λ6t
We can solve the nonlinear system consisting of these seven first order conditions
and the six constraints to yield the time-consistent optimal policy under Calvo pric-
ing. Specifically, without commitment, we need to find these thirteen time-invariant
policy rules which are functions of the two state variables {∆t−1, At}. That is, we
need to find policy functions such as F Pt = F
P (∆t−1, At), KPt = K
P (∆t−1, At), and
Πt = Π (∆t−1, At). Similar to the Rotemberg case, the Chebyshev collocation method
will be used to approximate these policy functions.
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Solution Method
We use the Chebyshev collocation method to globally approximate the policy functions.5
In contrast to the linear-quadratic approximation method, this projection method can
capture the extent to which the two approaches to modelling price stickiness differ, due
to the non-linearities inherent in the New Keynesian models. First, we discretize the
state space into a set of collocation nodes. In the Rotemberg model, there is one state
variable (At), while in the Calvo model there are two state variables (∆t−1, At). Ac-
cordingly, the space of the approximating functions for the Rotemberg pricing consists
of one-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. In comparison, the space of approximating
functions for the Calvo pricing is two-dimensional, and is, given by the tensor products of
two sets of Chebyshev polynomials. Then we define the residual functions based on the
equilibrium conditions. Gaussian-Hermite quadrature is used to approximate expectation
terms. Under Calvo pricing, the partial derivatives with respect to price dispersion, are
approximated by differentiating the Chebyshev polynomials. Finally, we solve the resul-
tant system of nonlinear equations consisting of the residual functions evaluated over all
the collocation nodes6. See appendix C.2 for details.
4.2 Numerical Results
4.2.1 Benchmark Parameters and Solution Accuracy
The benchmark parameters for Calvo pricing are taken from Anderson et al. (2010)
and are standard. We conduct a sensitivity analysis below. To make the results from
5Judd (1992) and Judd (1998) are good references.
6We also tried the time iteration method. That is, a smaller system of nonlinear equations, composed
of the residual functions evaluated at each collocation node, is solved repeatedly. For the benchmark
case in this paper, both methods find identical solutions. However, the time iteration method will be
used for other cases since it is generally faster and more robust.
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Rotemberg pricing comparable, the value of price adjustment cost is assigned so that the
linear quadratic approximation for both cases are equivalent7. This implies an equivalence
between the two forms of pricing provided the steady-state is undistorted with a rate of
inflation of zero. Such an approach is typically adopted in the literature even where
authors are considering models where these conditions are not met. Table 1 summarizes
the relevant parameter values.
With this benchmark parameterization, we solve the fully nonlinear models via Cheby-
shev collocation method. Following Anderson et al. (2010), the relative price dispersion
∆t is bounded by [1, 1.02], and the logged productivity at takes values from [−2σa/(1−
ρa), 2σa/(1 − ρa)] = [−0.4, 0.4]. For the Rotemberg case, the order of approximation na
is chosen to be 6, and the number of nodes for Gauss-Hermite quadrature q = 12. This
combination is quite accurate, since the maximum Euler equation error is on the order
of 10−8. For the Calvo case, the order of approximation na and n∆ are both assigned
to be 6, and q = 12 for Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The maximum Euler equation error
over the full range is on the order of 10−7. As suggested by Judd (1998), this order of
accuracy is reasonable.
4.2.2 Steady State Inflation Bias
Figure 1 illustrates the solution of the discretionary equilibria for the Calvo case.
Similar to the results in Anderson et al. (2010), the red dotted line plots the value of
∆t as a function of ∆t−1 in a narrow interval of [1, 1.02]. The steady state relative price
dispersion is about 1.0026 which is the intersection point between the red line and the 45-
degree solid line. At this fixed point, the value of optimal gross inflation Π (the dashed
line) is about 1.0054, implying an annualized inflation rate of 2.2%. In contrast, the
discretionary inflation rate for the Rotemberg case is 1.0047 or 1.89% per year. It is well
known that the optimal rate of inflation under commitment is zero, hence the inflation
bias is equal to the optimal rate of inflation under discretion. Therefore, the inflation
bias problem under Calvo pricing is more severe than that under Rotemberg pricing for
the benchmark parameters. We now turn to discuss this result, as well as undertaking a
sensitivity analysis.
To explore this difference further, we change the value of the monopolistic competition
distortion defined by /( − 1) by varying  and assessing its effect on the equilibrium
inflation bias. We interchangeable describe this measure of the monopolistic competi-
tion distortion as the flexible-price markup since it measures the markup that would be
observed under flexible prices. This approach is based on the fact that the size of the
inflation bias depends on the degree of monopolistic distortion, which makes steady state
(even flexible-price) output inefficient and hence higher inflation is attractive. Figures
2 and 3 present how the size of inflation bias changes as the markup is varied for the
Calvo and Rotemberg pricing, respectively. The benchmark  = 11 yields a felxible-price
markup of 1.1. When  decreases, the corresponding monopolistic competition distortion
and inflation bias increases. To illustrate the impact of the monopoly distortion on the
non-linearity, the inflation bias for both cases under the linear-quadratic approximation
(LQ) are also presented. The traditional linear-quadratic method becomes increasingly
inaccurate for larger distortions.
7That is, φ = (−1)θ(1−θ)(1−βθ) .
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Finally, we do some comparative statics with the model under both pricing approaches,
in order to explore how other parameters affect the severity of the inflation bias problem
and the sensitivity of the results obtained from the linear-quadratic approach. Table 2
and Table 3 summarize the robustness outcomes for the Calvo and Rotemberg pricing,
respectively. In general, the inflation bias problem is much worse under Calvo pricing.
4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 The Average Markup and Inflation Bias
We find that the inflationary bias problem is significantly greater under Calvo, especially
as the monopolistic competition distortion is increased. At the same time consumption
falls by more, and hours worked by less under Calvo as we increase this distortion, and
the average markup rises above the flexible price markup under Calvo, while decreases
under Rotemberg as a result of the non-linear effects of the inflation bias. See Figures 2
and 3.
In understanding the results it is helpful to consider the effects of inflation on the
two models. Ascari and Rossi (2012) discuss how inflation affects both models through a
‘wedge’ effect as well as an average markup effect. We shall consider the wedge effect first,
before turning to the average markup effects, which will turn out to be key. Under both
forms of nominal inertia the ‘wedge’ implies that the representative household’s aggregate
consumption will be lower for a given level of labour input as inflation rises. Under Calvo
this is because the dispersion of prices means that they need to consume relatively more
of the cheaper goods to compensate for the expensive goods given diminishing marginal
utility in the consumption of each good. As Damjanovic and Nolan (2010a) note this is
akin to a negative productivity shock, where we can combine the resource and aggregate
production function to yield,
Ct =
At
(1 + ψct )
Nt
where the inefficient wedge under Calvo, ψct = ∆t− 1, captures the extent to which price
dispersion has been raised above one.
Under Rotemberg the micro-foundations of the wedge is different - adjusting prices
uses up consumption goods directly. However, we can similarly combine the aggregate
production function and resource constraint to obtain a similar expression under Rotem-
berg,
Ct = At(1− ψRt )Nt
where the Rotemberg wedge, ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2 reflects the costs per unit of output of
changing prices. Therefore in both cases the labour costs of attaining a particular level
of aggregate consumption are higher, ceteris paribus, as inflation rises.
In order to assess how this affects the inflation bias problem facing the policy maker it
is helpful to imagine how a social planner would respond to the existence of such wedges
were he to imagine them to be exogenously given in the manner of a technology shock.
Given the form of household utility, the social planner would choose an optimal level of
labour input of
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At
(1 + ψct )
)1−σ
under Calvo, and
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At(1− ψRt )
)1−σ
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under Rotemberg. Therefore, for our benchmark calibration of σ = 1 the social planner
would not seek to adjust the labour input into the production process as a result of
increases in either of the wedges, but would simply allow consumption to fall. In other
words, for our benchmark calibration the efficiencies implied by these wedges do not give
the policy maker a further desire to generate a surprise inflation, ceteris paribus. While
if σ > 1 the social planner would seek to reduce the labour input as either of these
inefficiency wedges increased. That is, in this case the wedges would reduce the desire to
encourage firms to employ more workers ceteris paribus. We can see this from Tables 2
and 3 where raising the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, reduces
the inflation bias under both pricing models. Therefore the different inefficiency wedges
under Calvo and Rotemberg are not responsible for the observed inflation biases.
Instead the differences in inflation bias across the two models are generated by their
average mark-up behavior, which is fundamentally different. Consider the steady-state of
the average markup (equal to the inverse of real marginal cost) under Rotemberg which
is obtained by rearranging the deterministic steady state of the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (NKPC) under Rotemberg as,
mc−1 =
[
− 1

+
(1− β)

φ(Π− 1)Π
]−1
The second term in square brackets exists as a combination of steady-state inflation and
discounting on the part of firms (on behalf of their owners, the representative household).
Essentially as the firm discounts future profits they also discount future price adjustment
costs. As a result in the face of ongoing inflation, they will opt to partially delay the
required price adjustment such that the average mark-up is decreasing in inflation.
The effect of inflation on the average mark-up under Calvo is,
mc−1 =

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
In this case the effects of inflation on the average markup are ambiguous. However,
following King and Wolman (1996) this can be decomposed into two elements - the
marginal markup,
P ∗
MC
=

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)
and the price adjustment gap,
P
P ∗
=
(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
.
Here we can see that higher inflation raises the marginal markup. Firms facing the
possibility of being stuck with the current price for a prolonged period will tend to raise
their reset price when that price is likely to be eroded by inflation throughout the life of
that contract. The effect of inflation on the price adjustment gap will tend to reduce this
element of the average markup. However, except at very low rates of inflation, the effects
of inflation on the average markup through the marginal mark-up effect are positive.
Therefore we would expect to see average markups rise with inflation under Calvo,
but fall under Rotemberg. This, in turn, implies that the inflationary bias problem is
worsened under Calvo as the rising markups increase the policy makers incentives to
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introduce a surprise inflation ceteris paribus, at the same time as it is mitigated under
Rotemberg. As a result the inflation bias problem is significantly higher under Calvo
where consumption falls by more and hours by less than it does under Rotemberg.
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 2 and 3 consider the robustness of our results across various parameters for Calvo
and Rotemberg pricing, respectively. The first three rows of each Table increase the degree
of nominal inertia (where the Rotemberg price adjustment parameter is adjusted in line
with the changes in the Calvo parameter such that the linearized NKPC is equivalent
across both forms of nominal inertia). As we increase the degree of nominal inertia, we
find that the inflation bias rises under Calvo, but falls under Rotemberg. This is for the
reasons discussed above. Under Calvo greater price stickiness means that firms are likely
to be stuck with their current price for longer, meaning that they aggressively raise prices
when given the opportunity to do so. This will tend to raise average markups and worsen
the inflationary bias problem. In contrast under Rotemberg, higher price adjustment
costs result in firms wishing to delay price adjustment which reduces average markups
and reduces the inflation bias problem.
The next piece of sensitivity analysis looks at various parameterization of the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ. As noted above, at the benchmark
value of σ = 1, the social planner would not wish to expand employment as either of
the efficiency wedges due to the two forms of nominal inertia increase. While if σ < (>)
1 then they would wish to increase (decrease) the labour input as either efficient wedge
increased. Therefore we see the inflationary bias falling as σ increases across both forms
of nominal inertia. Finally, we consider an increase in the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply, ϕ, which serves to reduce the inflationary bias problem across both
types of price stickiness. As labour supply becomes less elastic there is less desire to use
costly inflation surprises to achieve only marginal increases in the level of output and the
inflation bias falls.
4.3.3 Relevance of Results
In order to assess the implications of our calculated levels of inflation bias under the
Rotemberg and Calvo forms of nominal inertia, we contrast our inflation rates with both
the empirical estimates of trend inflation and the critical values of trend inflation at which
the standard model develops non-standard properties.
Empirical Estimates of Trend Inflation Cogley and Sargent (2002)’s estimates of
trend inflation in a Bayesian VAR with time varying coefficient suggests that a large part
of the movements in inflation in the post-war period (its rise in the 1970s to its fall in
the 1980s) was due to the evolution of trend inflation rather than fluctuations around
that trend. Similarly, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) find that there is no inertia in price-
setting behavior due to indexation-type behavior, but that the inertia in the data can be
described by the evolution of trend-inflation in a generalized NKPC. While Ireland (2007)
finds that changes in the Fed’s inflation target can help explain inflation dynamics, where
that target rose from 1.25% in 1959 to over 8% in the late 1970s, before falling back to
2.5% in 2004. Therefore, to the extent that observed inflation reflects movements in an
underlying trend it would suggest that the empirical measures of trend inflation could
easily be consistent with our measures of the inflationary bias without having to resort
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to implausibly high monopolistic competition distortions. Moreover, when we augment
the model with an estimated process for mark-up shocks the magnitude of the resultant
inflation volatility can easily account for the observed volatility of inflation around its
time-varying trend.
Trend Inflation and Determinacy In order to further assess the implications of our
calculated levels of inflation bias under the Rotemberg and Calvo forms of nominal inertia,
we contrast our inflation rates with the key values of trend inflation at which the standard
model develops issues with the determinacy of standard interest rate rules. We could, of
course, have looked at other features highlighted in the trend inflation literature such as
the learnability of the model as trend inflation rises or its impulse responses to monetary
policy shocks and so on, but since the bifurcation in determinacy conditions reflects a
common underlying non-linearity which drives all the phenomena in the trend inflation
literature we choose to focus on this as a straight-forward way of assessing whether or not
our calculations suggest the concerns raised by the trend inflation literature are significant
or not.
Accordingly, we follow Ascari and Rossi (2012) and linearize our two economies around
a deterministic steady-state with an arbitrary rate of steady-state inflation (details of the
linearized models are provided in appendix C.4). We then assume a standard parame-
terization of a Taylor rule for monetary policy, Rt = 1.5pit + 0.5yt, and for a range of
values of the monopolistic competition distortion/flexible price mark-up, /( − 1), we
compute the steady-state rate of inflation at which the standard Taylor rule flips from
being determinate to being indeterminate. We then plot this determinacy frontier in
distortion-inflation space along side our inflation bias estimates, see Figure 4. We find
that at low levels of the monopolistic competition distortion the inflationary bias num-
ber lies below the determinacy frontier - in other words the standard Taylor rule would
remain determinate at the rates of inflation implied by our inflationary bias calculations.
However, as the markup is increased the inflation bias estimates cross the determinacy
frontier implying that at the rates of inflation implied by the inflation bias estimates
a standard Taylor rule would be indeterminate in a log-linearized representation of the
model. This is particularly true in the case of Calvo where a flexible price markup of just
over 11%, which is well within the range of standard parameterization in the literature.
In contrast, under Rotemberg the flexible-price markup needs to be double that push us
beyond the determinacy frontier.
5 The Effects of Cost-push Shocks
In the analysis above we have focussed on the stochastic steady state of the non-linear
policy problem to reveal the extent of the inflation bias. However, the response to shocks
can also be markedly different across the two forms of nominal inertia. In order to explore
the effect of cost-push shocks8 on policy trade-offs under discretion in our fully nonlinear
model, we, adopt the estimated shock process from Chen et al. (2014) which is modelled
as a revenue tax rate fluctuating around a steady state value of zero,
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
8The technology shocks already present in our model do not create meaningful policy trade-offs under
our benchmark calibration largely resulting in offsetting interest rate movements regardless of the form
of nominal inertia.
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where eτt ∼ N(0, 0.004862) and ρτp = 0.939. In a log-linearized model this is equivalent
to allowing for fluctuations in a desired mark-up through variations in . However, in
our non-linear model allowing  to be time varying has a direct impact on the measure
of price dispersion in a way which would not normally be considered to be an inherent
part of a cost push shock. Therefore we focus on variations in a revenue tax a means of
generating an autocorrelated cost push which is consistent with the data. The complete
model with the time-varying revenue tax rate is presented in appendix C.5.
We present two sets of results. In the first we consider the impact of an inflationary
cost push shock with our benchmark parameterization, but with θ = 0.625, and φ =
57.3684. These respective measure of price stickiness imply an identical steady-state
rate of inflation of 1.95%. Figure 5 reveals that even at this relatively modest degree of
inflation bias, there are non trivial differences in the impulse responses to an identical
cost push shock. These are driven by the same economic mechanisms observed in the
steady state analysis above as average markups rise under Calvo exacerbating the effects
of the cost push shock.
It should be noted that the conventional way of parameterizing the Rotemberg price
adjustment cost parameter such that the slopes of the linearized Phillips curves are iden-
tical would have implied a far lower value of φ = 43.7. In fact given the significant
differences in the inflation bias across the two forms of price-stickiness it is generally not
possible to calibrate the Rotemberg parameter by seeking to mimic the steady-state rate
of inflation observed under Calvo, ceteris paribus. Therefore, in a second exercise we
ensure a common steady-state rate of inflation of 2.54% by adopting the following set of
parameters,  = 11, θ = 0.8 under Calvo, and  = 9.7076, φ = 57.3684 under Rotemberg.
This calibration ensures that both forms of nominal inertia generate identical steady-state
rates of inflation and levels of output. Despite sharing a steady state in these dimensions,
the response to the identical shock is markedly different across Calvo and Rotemberg. In
Figure 6 we can see that inflation is 0.2% higher on impact from an identical cost push
shock under Calvo, while other variables, particularly output and consumption, exhibit
a hump-shaped response to the shock due to the gradual evolution of price dispersion,
which is not a feature of the response to the shock under Rotemberg pricing.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have contrasted the properties of the Calvo and Rotemberg forms of nom-
inal inertia which are commonly used in New Keynesian analyses of macroeconomic policy.
They are often treated as being interchangeable, largely because they generate equivalent
NKPC and policy implications when linearized around an efficient zero-inflation steady
state. However, our non-linear solution of the discretionary policy problem reveals some
striking differences across the two models of price stickiness.
Firstly, the inflation bias problem is far greater under Calvo pricing than Rotemberg
pricing, despite the fact that the costs of inflation are significantly higher under the
former. The reason for this is that inflation raises the average markup under Calvo
pricing as firms seek to raise their prices more aggressively whenever they can to avoid
the erosion of their relative price due to inflation. This increase in average markups
worsens the inflationary bias problem. In contrast, under Rotemberg pricing firms can
adjust prices in every period, and will moderate their average markups as inflation rises
as they attempt to delay some of the costs of price adjustment due to the discounting
inherent in their objective function.
Secondly, for empirically reasonable levels of monopoly power the inflation bias that
emerges from both models implies that the rates of inflation identified as being ‘trend’
inflation in empirical studies are reasonable. Moreover, the rates of inflation implied by
the model are sufficient for the non-linearities inherent in the model to place the economy
in the zone where the effects of trend inflation are found, in studies which approximate
the economy around a non-zero rate of steady-state inflation, to have profound implica-
tions for the determinacy properties of rules, the learnability of the rational expectations
equilibirum and the transmission of monetary policy. That is, the degree of inflation bias
generated by the model implies that the non-linearities inherent in the model and the
choice of form of nominal inertia matter.
Thirdly, we extended the model to consider the stabilization of the economy in the
face of mark-up shocks. Here we find that the non-linearities that generate radically
different degrees of inflation bias in the steady state also imply profound differences in
the monetary policy response to the same shock both across models, with the inflation
response to a cost-push shock being significantly greater under Calvo, while possibly also
being associated with a hump-shaped output/consumption response as a result of the
evolution of price dispersion which is absent from the Rotemberg model and typically
ignored in the linearized New Keynesian model.
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A Tables
Table 1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Definition
β 0.99 Quarterly discount factor
σ 1 Relative risk aversion coefficient
ϕ 1 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
 11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
θ 0.75 Probability of fixing prices in each quarter
ρa 0.95 AR-coefficient of technology shock
σa 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shock
φ 116 Rotemberg adjustment cost
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis for Calvo pricing
Parameter Values Numerical results
θ σ ϕ  Price dispersion Nonlinear solution LQ solution
θ 0.05 1 1 11 1.0000 1.71 1.66
0.3 1 1 11 1.0001 1.78 1.66
0.5 1 1 11 1.0003 1.84 1.66
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.85 1 1 11 1.0275 3.01 1.64
0.90 1 1 11 1.0726 2.55 1.60
σ 0.75 0.3 1 11 1.0308 5.64 2.54
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.75 5 1 11 1.0002 0.60 0.56
ϕ 0.75 1 0.36 11 1.0139 4.31 2.42
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.75 1 4.75 11 1.0002 0.60 0.56
Note: the last two columns contain the annualized inflation rate in percentage solved by the projection method
and the LQ method, respectively.
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for Rotemberg pricing
Parameter Values Annualized Inflation rate (%)
θ σ ϕ  Nonlinear solution LQ solution
θ 0.05 1 1 1 1.94 1.83
0.3 1 1 1 1.94 1.83
0.5 1 1 11 1.93 1.83
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.85 1 1 11 1.83 1.80
0.90 1 1 11 1.72 1.76
σ 0.75 0.3 1 11 2.95 2.54
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.75 5 1 11 0.64 0.56
ϕ 0.75 1 0.36 11 2.83 2.42
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.75 1 4.75 11 0.64 0.56
Note: for comparison, θ, which affects φ, is included.
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Figure 1: Relative price dispersion and inflation as functions of lagged relative price dispersion. This figure shows how
the relative price dispersion converges to its steady state.
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Figure 2: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Rotemberg pricing. The monopolistic distortion is
measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and projection method
are compared.
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Figure 3: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Calvo pricing. The monopolistic distortion is
measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and projection method
are compared.
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Figure 4: The threshold of inflation rate for indeterminacy versus the inflation bias from the nonlinear method
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Figure 5: The impulse response functions to one percent positive tax-driven cost-push shock under Calvo and Rotemberg
pricing. Note that the two cases are calibrated so that the steady state inflation rate is equal.
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Figure 6: The impulse response functions to one percent positive tax-driven cost-push shock under Calvo and Rotemberg
pricing. Note that each model is calibrated so that the steady state output and inflation rates are equal across both cases.
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C Technical Appendix (Not for Publication)
C.1 Summary of Models
C.1.1 Rotemberg Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given as follows:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
Technology:
Yt = AtNt
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
=
(Yt/At)
ϕCσt
At
= Yt
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
We can simplify these equilibrium conditions by eliminating the interest rate and
labour supply from the constraints, so that consumption can be considered as the mone-
tary policy instrument. Specifically,
Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
while the objective function is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
Note that the state variables are productivity (and any other exogenous shock pro-
cesses we choose to add).
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C.1.2 Calvo Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given below:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct =
AtNt
∆t
Phillips curve:
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
Inflation:
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1
Price dispersion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1
= (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
= (Yt∆t)
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
Note that the state variables are not just productivity, but also price dispersion.
C.2 The Chebyshev Collocation Method
C.2.1 Algorithm for Rotemberg Pricing
In the following, let st denote the state of the economy at time t. There are five functional
equations associated with five endogenous variables {Ct, Yt,Πt, λ1t, λ1t}.
The state is st = at ≡ lnAt, which evolves according to the following motion equation:
at+1 = ρaat + eat
where 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and technology innovation eat is an i.i.d. normal random variable,
which has a zero mean and a finite standard deviation σa.
Let’s define a new function X : R → R5, in order to collect the policy functions of
endogenous variables as follows:
X(st) = (Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st))
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Given the specification of the function X, the equilibrium conditions can be written more
compactly as,
Γ(st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R1+5+1 → R5 summarizes the full set of dynamic equilibrium relationship, and
Z (X(st+1)) = M(At+1). Then the problem is to find a vector-valued function X that Γ
maps to the zero function. Projection methods, hence, can be used.
The Chebyshev collocation method which we use to approximate policy functions
under Rotemberg pricing can be described as follows:
1. Choose an order of approximation na, compute the na + 1 roots of the Chebychev
polynomial of order na + 1 as
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, and formulate initial guesses for θy and θΠ.
2. Compute collocation points
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, where a = log(A) is logged technology shock. Note that the
number of collocation nodes is na + 1.
3. Formulate the approximating policy functions. Let Ti(z) = cos(i cos
−1(z)) de-
note the Chebyshev polynomial of order i, z ∈ [−1, 1], and let ξ denote a lin-
ear function mapping the domain of x ∈ [x, x] into [−1, 1]. In this way, Ti(ξ(x))
are Chebyshev polynomials adapted to x ∈ [x, x] for i = 0, 1, .... Apparently,
ξ(x) = 2 (x− x) / (x− x) − 1. Then, a degree na Chebyshev polynomial approx-
imation for the five decision rules at each nodes ai can be written as in vector
form
X(ai) = T (ξ(ai))ΘX
where ΘX = [θy, θc, θpi, θλ1 , θλ2 ] is a (1 + na)×5 matrix comprised of the Chebyshev
collocation coefficients, and T (ξ(ai)) is a 1 × (1 + na) matrix of the Chebyshev
polynomials evaluated at node ai.
4. At each collocation point ai, calculate the values of the five residual functions defined
by the five equilibrium conditions as follows: assuming a Gaussian distribution for
the shock eat ∼ N(0, σ2a), To compute the integral part, we make the following
change of variables: z = ea/
√
2σ2a ∼ N(0, 1/2), then
Et [M (st+1)]
=
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(−z2) dz
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where we employ a Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the integral. We
compute the nodes zj and weights ωj for the quadrature such that
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
j=1
 ωjĈ (ρaai + zj√2σ2a; θy, θpi)σ Ŷ (ρaai + zj√2σ2a; θy)×
Π̂
(
ρaai + zj
√
2σ2a; θpi
)(
Π̂
(
ρaai + zj
√
2σ2a; θpi
)
− 1
) 
≡ Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
Then, the residual functions can be written as
R1 = Ĉ(ai; θc)
−σ−λ̂1(ai; θλ1)+λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
[
σŶ (ai; θy)
ϕĈ(ai; θc)
σ−1 exp (ai) −ϕ−1
+σφβĈ(ai; θc)
σ−1Ŷ (ai; θy)−1Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
]
R2 = Ŷ (ai; θy)
ϕ exp (ai)
−ϕ−1 −
[
1− φ
2
(
Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)2]
λ̂1(ai; θλ1)
− λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
[
ϕŶ (ai; θy)
ϕ−1Ĉ(ai; θc)σ exp (ai) −ϕ−1
−φβĈ(ai; θc)σŶ (ai; θy)−2Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
]
R3 = λ̂1(ai; θλ1)
(
1− Π̂(ai; θpi)
)
Ŷ (ai; θy)− λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
(
2Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)
R4 = Ĉ(ai; θc)−
[
1− φ
2
(
Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)2]
Ŷ (ai; θy)
R5 = (1− ) + Ŷ (ai; θy)ϕĈ(ai; θc)σ exp (ai) −ϕ−1
− φΠ̂(ai; θpi)
(
Π̂(ai)− 1
)
+ φβĈ(ai; θc)
σŶ (ai; θy)
−1Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
where the hat symbol indicates the corresponding approximate policy functions.
5. If all residuals are close enough to zero then stop, else update {θy, θc, θpi, θλ1 , θλ2},
and go back to step 3.
The last step uses Christopher A. Sims’ csolve9 to solve the system of nonlinear
equations, Rj = 0 for j = 1, ..., 5. When implementing the above algorithm, we first
use lower order Chebyshev polynomials where steady states can be good initial guesses.
Then, we increase the order of approximation and take as starting value the solution from
the previous lower order approximation. This informal homotopy continuation method
follows the advice from Anderson et al. (2010).
9The solver can be found at http://dge.repec.org/codes/sims/optimize/csolve.m.
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C.2.2 Algorithm for Calvo Pricing
Now the state space is st = (∆t−1, At), where price dispersion ∆t−1 is endogenous and
technology At is exogenous and respectively, with the following law of motion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1
at = ρaat−1 + eat
There are 7 endogenous variables and 6 Lagrangian multipliers, hence 13 functional equa-
tions. Similar to Rotemberg pricing, we can rewrite this nonlinear system a more compact
form,
Γ (st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))] , Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R2+13+3+3 → R13 summarizing the equilibrium relationship,
X(st) =
(
Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st),
P∗t (st)
Pt(st)
, K
p
t (st), F
p
t (st),∆t(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st), λ3t(st), λ4t(st), λ5t(st), λ6t(st)
)
collecting the policy functions we need to solve, with X : R2 → R13, and
Z (X(st+1)) =
 Z1 (X(st+1))Z2 (X(st+1))
Z3 (X(st+1))
 =
 M(∆t, at+1)L(∆t, at+1)
(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1

and
Z∆ (X(st+1)) =

∂Z1(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z2(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z3(X(st+1))
∂∆t
 =

∂M(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂L(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂[(Πt+1)
λ6t+1]
∂∆t

=
  (Πt+1)
−1 Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1 ∂Πt+1∂∆t + (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F pt+1
∂∆t
 (Πt+1)
−1 λ6t+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂λ6t+1
∂∆t

Note we are assuming Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))] = ∂Et [Z (X(st+1))] /∆t, which is normally valid
using the Interchange of Integration and Differentiation Theorem.
The Chebyshev collocation method which we use to solve this nonlinear system can
be described as follows:
1. Choose an order of approximation n∆ and na for each dimension of the state space
st = (∆t−1, at), then there are Ns = (n∆ + 1)× (na + 1) nodes in the state space.
2. Compute the n∆ + 1 and na + 1 roots of the Chebychev polynomial of order n∆ + 1
and na + 1 as
zi∆ = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(n∆ + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1.
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
and formulate initial guesses for the approximating coefficients.
35
3. Compute collocation points ai as
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, where a = log(A) is logged technology shock. Note that the
number of collocation nodes is na + 1. Similarly, compute collocation points ∆i as
∆i =
∆ + ∆
2
+
∆−∆
2
zi∆ =
∆−∆
2
(
zi∆ + 1
)
+ ∆
for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [∆,∆].
4. At each node (∆i, aj), for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., na+ 1, compute X(st),
that is,
X(∆i, aj) = Ω(∆i, aj)ΘX
where Ω(∆i, aj) ≡ [Tj∆(ξ(∆i)Tja(ξ (aj))], j∆ = 0, ..., n∆, and ja = 0, ..., na, is a
1×Ns matrix of two-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at node (∆i, aj),
and
ΘX =
[
θc, θy, θpi, θp, θk, θf , θ∆, θλ1 , θλ2 , θλ3 , θλ4 , θλ5 , θλ6
]
is a Ns × 13 matrix of the collocation coefficients.
5. At each node (∆i, aj), for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, compute the
possible values of future policy functions X(st+1) for k = 1, ..., q. That is,
Xt+1(∆i, aj) = Ωt+1(∆i, aj)ΘX
where q is the number of quadrature nodes, and the subscript t + 1 indicates next
period values. Note that
Ωt+1(∆i, aj) ≡
[
Tj∆(ξ(∆̂(∆i, aj; θ
∆)))Tja(ξ(ρaaj + zk
√
2σ2a))
]
with j∆ = 0, ..., n∆, and ja = 0, ..., na, is a q×Ns matrix of Chebyshev polynomials
evaluated at t+ 1 nodes (∆t, at+1), and the hat symbol indicates the corresponding
approximate policy functions.
The two auxilliary functions can be calculated as follows:
M(st+1) ≈
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂(st+1; θ
k)
and,
L(st+1) ≈
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂ (st+1; θ
f ).
6. Calculate the expectation terms at each node (∆i, aj). Let z = ea/
√
2σ2a, and we
have
Et [M(st+1)] =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
Kpt+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
Kpt+1 exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂(st+1; θ
k)
≡ Ψ (∆i, aj, q) ,
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Et [L(st+1)] =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
−1 F pt+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂ (st+1; θ
f )
≡ Θ (∆i, aj, q) ,
and
Et [(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1] =
1
σa
√
2Π
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
≈ 1√
Π
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
Π)
)−1
λ̂6(st+1; θ
λ6)
≡ Λ (∆i, aj, q) .
7. Calculate the two partial derivatives under expectation, that is,
∂Et [M(st+1)]
∂∆t
= Et
[
∂M(st+1)
∂∆t
]
= Et
[
 (Πt+1)
−1 Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
∂Et [L(st+1)]
∂∆t
= Et
[
∂L(st+1)
∂∆t
]
= Et
[
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
.
Hence, we only need to compute ∂Πt+1/∂∆t, ∂K
p
t+1/∂∆t and ∂F
p
t+1/∂∆t. Note that
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θpij∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆i))Tja(ξ(aj)) ≡ Π̂∆
∂Kpt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θkj∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja(ξ(at+1)) ≡ K̂∆
∂F pt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θfj∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja(ξ(at+1)) ≡ F̂∆
Now, we can calculate
∂Et [M(st+1)]
∂∆t
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
[
 (Πt+1)
−1Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[

(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
K̂(st+1; θ
k)Π̂∆ +
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂∆
]
≡ M̂ (∆i, aj, q) ,
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∂Et [L(st+1)]
∂∆t
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
[
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1 ∂Πt+1∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F pt+1
∂∆t
]
exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[
(− 1)
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−2
F̂ (st+1; θ
f )Π̂∆ +
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂∆
]
≡ L̂ (∆i, aj, q) .
8. At each collocation point (∆i, aj), calcuate the values of the thirteen residual func-
tions defined by the equilibrium conditions as follows:
R1 = Ŷ (∆i, aj; θ
y)− Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)
R2 = p̂(∆i, aj; θ
p)−
(

− 1
)
K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θf )
R3 = K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)−(∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy))ϕ exp(aj)−ϕ−1Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)−θβΨ (∆i, aj, q)
R4 = F̂ (∆i, aj; θ
f )− Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σ + θβΘ (∆i, aj, q)
R5 = 1− (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)1− − θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)−1
R6 = ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ
∆)− (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)− − θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)∆i
R7 = Ĉ(∆i, aj; θ
c)−σ−λ̂1(∆i, aj; θλ1)+σŶ (∆i, aj; θy)Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σ−1λ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4)
R8 = −∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)1+ϕŶ (∆i, aj; θy)ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕ + λ̂1(∆i, aj; θλ1)
− (1 + ϕ)(∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy))ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕλ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)
− Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σλ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4)
R9 = λ̂2(∆i, aj; θ
λ2) + (1− θ)(− 1)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)−λ̂5(∆i, aj; θλ5)
+ (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)−−1λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)
R10 = −(− 1)θλ̂5(∆i, aj; θλ5)− θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)∆i
R11 = −
(

− 1
)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θ
f )−1λ̂2(∆i, aj; θλ2) + λ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)
R12 =
(

− 1
)
K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θf )2
λ̂2(∆i, aj; θ
λ2) + λ̂4(∆i, aj; θ
λ4)
R13 = −Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)1+ϕ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕ − θβΛ (∆i, aj, q)
− ϕ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)ϕ−1Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)1+ϕλ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3) exp(aj)−1−ϕ
− θβM̂ (∆i, aj, q) λ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)− θβL̂ (∆i, aj, q) λ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4) + λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)
9. Finally, check the stopping rules. If all residuals are close enough to zero then stop,
else update the approximation coefficients and go back to step 4.
The equation solver csolve written by Christopher A. Sims is employed to solve the
resulted system of nonlinear equations. When implementing the above algorithm, we
start from lower order Chebyshev polynomials and formulate the initial guesses based on
the results in Anderson et al. (2010). Then, we increase the order of approximation and
take as starting value the solution from the previous lower order approximation. This
informal homotopy continuation idea ensures us to find the solution.
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C.3 Welfare Comparison
In order to compare the social welfare under Calvo and Rotemberg pricing in a fully
nonlinear model, we first describe the second-order approximation to welfare. Then
we transform the welfare as the fraction of the consumption path under the Ramsey
allocation that must be given up in order to equalize welfare under the Ramsey policy
and discretionary policy.
C.3.1 The Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
Ut ≡ U(Ct, Nt) = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
Let X̂t ≡ log
(
Xt/X
)
denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state X. In
addition, let X˜t = Xt−X denote the linear deviation of Xt around its steady state value.
Then using a second-order Taylor approximation,
Xt −X
X
=
X˜t
X
= X̂t +
1
2
X̂2t + o(2) (23)
where o(2) represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the bound on the amplitude
of the relevant shocks. We will repeatedly use (23) to derive a second-order approximation
to the social welfare.
Now consider the second-order approximation to per period utility,
Ut = U + C
1−σ
[
Ĉt +
1− σ
2
Ĉ2t
]
−N1+ϕ
[
N̂t +
1 + ϕ
2
N̂2t
]
+ o(2)
where
U =
C
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
N
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
Rotemberg Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt, is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t −
φ
2
Π̂2t + o(2)
such that,
Ut = U − (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
ϕ+ σ
Π̂2t
]
+ C
1−σ
 Φ22(ϕ+σ) − (1−σ)(1−Φ)−(1+ϕ)1+ϕ Ŷ ft
+ (1−σ)(σ+ϕ)
2(1+ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2
+ o(2) (24)
where Ŷ ft = log
(
Y ft /Y
f
)
denote the log-deviation of output from its steady state under
flexible price, xt ≡ Ŷt−Ŷ ft is the output gap, x∗ ≡ lnY −lnY f = − ln (1− Φ) / (σ + ϕ) ≈
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Φ/ (σ + ϕ) is a measure of the distortion created by the presence of monopolistic compe-
tition alone, t.i.p. are terms independent of policy, and terms like Φ
(
Ŷ ft
)2
and ΦŶtŶ
f
t
are omitted10. In addition, the fact that N
1+ϕ
= (1− −1)C1−σ ≡ (1− Φ)C1−σ, and
Ât = (ϕ+ σ) / (1 + ϕ) Ŷ
f
t is used in deriving (24).
Hence,
WR ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt =
U
1− β −
(σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
σ + ϕ
Π̂2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
=
U
1− β − ΩRE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λR (xt − x∗)2 + Π̂2t
]
(25)
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩR ≡ φC
1−σ
2
λR ≡ σ + ϕ
φ
Note that we derive the LQ welfare function explicitly retaining the relevant t.i.p in order
to make a legitimate comparison with the social welfare obtained from the fully nonlinear
model.
In order to calculate the inflation bias under LQ method, we write down the log-
linearized IS equation and NKPC below. The IS curve is,
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
and the NKPC is,
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 +
(− 1) (ϕ+ σ)
φ
xt
Calvo Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t + o(2)
and it can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, chap 6) that,
N̂t =
(
Ŷt − Ât
)
+

2
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
+ o(2)
10When Φ = 1/ is so small that the product of Φ with a second-order term can be ignored as negligible.
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Hence, similar to the Rotemberg case,
Ut = U − (ϕ+ σ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + 
ϕ+ σ
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)]
+C
1−σ
[
Φ2
2 (ϕ+ σ)
− (1− σ) (1− Φ)− (1 + ϕ)
(1 + ϕ)
Ŷ ft +
(1− σ) (σ + ϕ)
2 (1 + ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2]
+ o(2)
The next step is to relate price dispersion ∆t ≡ varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
to the average inflation rate
across all firms. Walsh (2003, p.554) shows that
∆t ≈ θ∆t−1 +
(
θ
1− θ
)
pi2t
which implies
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
∞∑
t=0
βtpi
2
t
Therefore,
WC =
U
1− β − ΩCE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λC (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)\
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩC ≡ (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2

κ
λC ≡ κ/
κ ≡ (1− θ) (1− θβ) (σ + ϕ)
θ
The log-linearized IS equation and NKPC are given, respectively, as follows:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 + κxt
Note that when
φ =
(− 1) θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
the NKPC under both Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing are the same. Also note
that λR =
(

−1
)
λC , and ΩR =
(
−1

)
ΩC . The inflation weights λR and λC differ only
marginally, since  usually takes values between 7 and 10 in the applied literature.
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C.3.2 Inflation Bias Under LQ Method
We can rewrite the above LQ model as follows, using pit = Πt− 1 ≈ ln (Πt)− ln
(
Π
)
= Π̂t
and it = Rt − 1 ≈ ln (Rt)− ln
(
R
)
= R̂t:
max
{xt,pit}
−ΩjE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λj (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
subject to
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt (26)
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
where j = R,C. Woodford (2003, p.471) shows that the equilibrium inflation under
optimal discretion is
pit =
λj
λj + κ2
(βEtpit+1 + κx
∗)
hence the steady state pi under rational expectation satisfies
pi =
λj
λj + κ2
(βpi + κx∗)
that is,
pi =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2x
∗ =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2
Φ
(σ + ϕ)
with j = R,C. pi is the so-called inflation bias, relative to the targeted zero rate of
inflation which is optimal under perfect commitment.
C.3.3 Relative Welfare Cost
The welfare under discretion from the LQ method is calculated as follows. Unless stated
otherwise, the superscript d denotes the discretion case, and subscripts R and C represent
the Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. From (26), x = (1− β) pi/κ, then using
the log-linearized model we can solve for steady state values for deviations Ĉt and N̂t,
denoted as Ĉ and N̂ , respectively. It is straightforward to show that Ĉ = N̂ = Ŷ = x.
Finally, the steady state values for levels Ct and Nt, are
C
d
j = C
r
eĈ ≈ Cr
(
1 + Ĉ
)
= C
r
(1 + x)
N
d
j = N
r
eN̂ ≈ N r
(
1 + N̂
)
= N
r
(1 + x)
where j = R,C, and
C
r
= N
r
=
(
− 1

)1/(σ+ϕ)
are the Ramsey steady states around which we log-linearize the model. Therefore,
Wj =
1
1− β

(
C
d
j
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ −
(
N
d
j
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− Ωj
1− β
[
λj
(
(1− β) pi
κ
− Φ
(ϕ+ σ)
)2
+ pi2
]
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+(
C
d
j
)1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β)
[
Φ2 − (1− σ) (1 + ϕ)σ
2
a
(1− ρa)
]
where j = R,C.
For the fully nonlinear method, the welfare under discretion is calculated by adding
corresponding policy functions into optimal policy problem and then approximated by
the Chebyshev collocation method. That is,
W dR,t = W
d
R (At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dR(At+1)
]
W dC,t = W
d
C (∆t−1, At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dC(∆t, At+1)
]
and the steady state welfare, denoted as W dR and W
d
C for ease of notation, can be corre-
spondingly found.
Note that WR, W
d
R and WC , W
d
C which represent the conditional expectation of life-
time utility, are absolute welfare measures under Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing,
respectively. However, the utility function is ordinal, so a welfare measure based on the
value function is not very revealing. Hence, we calculate the relative welfare cost in terms
of the consumption equivalent units under the Ramsey allocation. Specifically, we want
to find ξ such that
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cdt , N
d
t ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1− ξ)Crt , N rt )
where the r superscript denotes the Ramsey allocation (under full commitment), and
the d superscript stands for the allocation under discretion. Given the utility function
adopted, the expression for ξ in percentage terms is
ξ =
{
1− exp [(1− β) (W d −W r)]}× 100 (27)
where
W d ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCdt −
(
Ndt
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
represents the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the economy under discre-
tion, and
W r ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCrt −
(N rt )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
=
1
1− β
[
lnC
r −
(
N
r)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
is the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility associated with the economy under full
commitment. Recall that σ = 1 is the benchmark case in our paper.
Hence, under the Rotemberg case,
ξR =
{ {1− exp [(1− β) (WR −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dR −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
and under the Calvo case,
ξC =
{ {1− exp [(1− β) (WC −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dC −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
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C.4 Trend Inflation
In this section we explore the determinacy properties of our simple New Keynesian models
at the levels of steady-state inflation implied by our non-linear optimal policy exercise.
C.4.1 The Rotemberg Case
Following Ascari and Rossi (2012) the linearized version of our New Keyensian model
under Rotemberg pricing can be shown to be,
pit = γfβEtpit+1 + γyβ(1− σ)∆Etyt+1 + γmcmct
mct = (σ + ϕ)yt − ζcσpit − (1 + ϕ)at
yt = Etyt+1 − ζc∆Etpit+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
where
ζc =
φ(pi − 1)pi
1− φ
2
(pi − 1)2
C
Y
= 1− φ
2
(pi − 1)2
ρ = (2pi2 − pi)C/Y + β[(pi − 1)pi]2σφ
γf =
(2pi2 − pi)C/Y + [(pi − 1)pi]2σφ
ρ
γy =
(pi2 − pi)C/Y
ρ
γmc =
(− 1 + φ(pi2 − pi)(1− β))C/Y
φρ
This can be written in matrix form as,
A0

pit
yt
it
Etpit+1
Etyt+1
 = A1

pit−1
yt−1
it−1
pit
yt

where
A0 =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
−αpi −αy 1 0 0
−γmcζcσ −γyβ(1− σ) + γmc(σ + ϕ) 0 γfβ γyβ(1− σ)
ζc 0 − 1σ −ζc + 1σ 1

A1 =

0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

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C.4.2 The Calvo Case
pit = [βpi + η(θ − 1)]Etpit+1 + κyt + λϕst + ηEtψt+1
ψt = (1− σ)(1− θβpi−1)yt + θβpi−1[(− 1)Etpit+1 + Etψt+1]
st = ξpit + θpi
st−1
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
where
λ =
(1− θpi−1)(1− θβpi)
θpi−1
η = β(pi − 1)(1− θpi−1)
κ = λ(σ + ϕ) + η(1− σ)
ξ =
θpi−1(pi − 1)
1− θpi−1
B0

pit
yt
it
st
Etpit+1
Etyt+1
Etψt+1

= B1

pit−1
yt−1
it−1
st−1
pit
yt
ψt

where
B0 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−αpi −αy 1 0 0 0 0
−ξ 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 κ 0 λϕ βpi + η(θ − 1) 0 η
0 0 − 1
σ
0 1
σ
1 0
0 (1− σ)(1− θβpi−1) 0 0 θβpi−1(− 1) 0 θβpi−1

B1 =

0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 θpi 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1

This enables us to assess the determinacy properties of the underlying dynamic systems
by considering the eigenvalues of the transition matrices, A0−1A1 and B0−1B1, in the
cases of Rotemberg and Calvo, respectively. We require two roots with modulus in excess
of one to ensure determinacy in the case of Rotemberg, and three under Calvo.
Notice that when pi = 1, the linearized systems reduce to.
pit = βEtpit+1 +
− 1
φ
[(σ + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)at]
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under Rotemberg, and,
pit = βEtpit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
[(σ + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)at]
under Calvo, with both representations sharing the same Euler equation,
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
Therefore, linearized around a zero inflation steady-state the two systems are identical
provided,
− 1
φ
=
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
which is the standard means of calibrating the adjustment cost parameter, φ, with refer-
ence to evidence on the probability of price change under Calvo, 1− θ.
C.5 The Model With Time-Varying Tax Rate
To indirectly introduce cost push shock, we consider the revenue tax τpt which is assumed
to follow the following autoregressive process,
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
eτt
i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2τ)
With revenue tax τpt, the expected discounted sum of nominal profits under Rotem-
berg pricing is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
[
(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt
]
and under Calvo it can be written as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s [(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt+s(j)−mct+sYt+s(j)Pt+s]
Based on the derivation of the benchmark model, it is quite straightforward to write
down the complete system of non-linear equations describing the discretionary equilib-
rium. We will use Chebyshev collocation with time iteration method to solve the models
with time-varying tax for optimal policy functions.
C.5.1 The Rotemberg Pricing
Since we want to focus on the effect of tax rate, then the technology shock can be shut
down by setting At ≡ 1. This, in fact, can simplify numerical computation.
The Lagrangian is
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (τpt+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
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where λjt (j = 1, 2) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
M(τpt+1) ≡ C−σt+1Nt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σCσ−1t N
ϕ
t + σφβC
σ−1
t N
−1
t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
Nt
ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕNt
ϕ−1Cσt
−φβCσt N−2t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
λ1tφ (1− Πt)Nt = λ2tφ (2Πt − 1)
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt
0 = (1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβ
Cσt
Nt
Et [M(τpt+1)] .
C.5.2 The Calvo Pricing
Similar to the Rotemberg case, we solve a simpler question by shutting down the tech-
nology shock. Then, there are two state variables, τpt and ∆t−1. The Lagrangian is given
as follow:
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, τpt+1)]
+ λ1t[Nt/∆t − Ct]
+ λ2t
[
(1− τpt) Nt
∆tCσt
+ θβEt [L(∆t, τpt+1)]− Ft
]
+ λ3t
[
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt [M(∆t, τpt+1)]− St
]
+ λ4t
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1 −∆t
]
+ λ5t
[
Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
− St
]
where λjt (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
L(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Π−1t+1Ft+1
M(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Πt+1St+1
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
Ct = Nt/∆t
Ft = (1− τpt)C1−σt + θβEt
[
Π−1t+1Ft+1
]
St =
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt
[
Πt+1St+1
]
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∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1
St = Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = 1− λ1tCσt − σ(1− τpt)λ2t
0 = ∆tC
σ
t Nt
ϕ − Cσt λ1t − (1− τpt)λ2t −
(ϕ+ 1)Cσt N
ϕ
t λ3t
(1− −1)
0 = λ2t − λ5t
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = λ3t + λ5t
0 = 
((
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
−∆t−1Πt
)
λ4t
− 1
1− θ
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
1−
λ5tFt
0 =
Ct
∆t
λ1t + (1− τpt)C
1−σ
t
∆t
λ2t +
Nϕt Ct
(1− −1)∆tλ3t
+ λ4t − θβλ2tEt [L1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβλ3tEt [M1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβEt
[
Πt+1λ4t+1
]
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